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BOOK REVIEWS
By Edward S. Corwin. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge. 1948. Pp. ix, 210.
$3.00.t
Edward Samuel Corwin, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, has contributed numerous
articles to law reviews and journals on economics, government, philosophy, constitutional history and constitutional law.
His leading books are The Twilight of the Supreme Court
(1937); The Constitution What It Means Today (10 Ed.
1948) ; Court Over Constitution (1938) ; Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (1941) ; and his recent book Liberty Against Government (1948). Since each book deals with some phase of
constitutional history and law, there is a great deal of unity
and coherence between them, and a reasonable amount of repetition on certain ideas may be noted. However, each book
has its own merits. These excellent books give proof of the
many sidedness of the problems of constitutional liberty.
The original concepts of liberty, as defined by the author, is
the natural rights of an individual against government in contrast with the modern concept of liberty or freedom as meaning
the protection of the rights of an individual against economic
and other external social control by conflicting groups. The
entire first chapter makes a comparison between the concept
of constitutional liberty which is a juridical concept and the
more broad concept of civil liberty or freedom, which were
originally political concepts.
In chapter two the author traces the concept of constitutional
liberty from Roman and English sources. He attempts to
prove that the liberties as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution are based on the premise that the natural law
is "superior to the will of any human governor or law maker,"
and that this concept of law was the view of Demosthenes,
Sophocles, Cicero, and other eminent philosophers and statesmen. The concepts of "the law of nature," "right reason," and
"equality of all men" permeated their writings, which in time
influenced the juridical and political ideas of Anglo-American
jurisprudence. John of Salisbury, writer of Statesman's Book,
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT.

t Published in 43 Il. L. Rev. 897 (1949)
University School of Law.)

(Published by the Northwestern
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was one of the first Englishmen who presented the concept of
natural law as a "force of law among all nations and which
absolutely cannot be broken." This view is the basis for the
theory that governmental authority should be inherently
limited and not unlimited. Theoretically at least, and with considerable historical proof, the author presented the view that
medieval England made contribution to the American theory
of liberty against government. Even though the historians
may inform us of the myth of Magna Charta, Mr. Corwin is
of the opinion that the immemorial rights and privileges which
the American people asserted at the Revolution were at least
the work of Sir Edward Coke and that he, in a lawyer-like
method, had interpreted the Magna Charta in such a way that
the Magna Charta has been regarded by us as the charter of
our civil liberties. It should be noted that the Magna Charta
was a declaration of existing rights and did not expressly
grant new rights to the feudal barons. After the War of Roses,
the prestige of the Bench and Bar increased, and the basic
principles of the Magna Charta were incorporated in the common law of England. Effective restraint on the power of the
crown was, in a large measure, due to professional craftsmanship on the part of the lawyers and judges. Sir Edward Coke's
contribution to the subject matter of liberty against government was that the royal authority was a common law concept
and hence subject to the common law and that even an act of
Parliament should be in harmony with common law principles
of right and reason. Coke's views were not only expressed in
his Institutes, but also in legal opinions of other judges, in
digests, and in the abridgments of that period.
According to the author, John Locke, in his Treatise on Civil
Government expressed views which were favorable or similar
to that of Cicero and Edward Coke in that he emphasized that
the leg.slative power is not the ultimate power of a state. Because of political and social conditions, the concepts of supremacy of Parliament became an accepted fact under the Stuart
Kings. Both Hobbes and Blackstone approved the theory of
parliamentary supremacy. The philosophical concepts of
Cicero, Coke, and Locke were the basis of the American constitutional principles which recognized certain natural rights,
that is, individual liberties, which were above and beyond governmental powers.
The philosophical and historical interpretations as pre-
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sented in the first two chapters in Corwin's books have special
value to law students who are enrolled in a course in Constitutional Law. Corwin has given proof that the American Constitution has its roots in the past, which background the students should know.
The material in Chapter III, "Liberty Into Property, Before
the Civil War" sketches a brief history of the development of
the now moot question of the validity of judicial review.
Specifically the chapter traces the concept of liberty in the
leading decisions of state courts and federal courts to mean
the protection and preservation of the property rights of the
individual. Corwin labelled them vested rights. In a short
period of time, the judicial attitude towards the "doctrine of
vested rights" was extended to the "obligation of contract"
clause in the Constitution. All legislation whether by the states
or by the federal government would have to meet the test of
reasonableness, that is, the law as enacted must not unduly or
unreasonably restrict a person in the acquisition of property,
or the use of his rights in property, or the free exercise of his
freedom of contract. These rights were interpreted by the
judges to be the natural rights of man. The terms "law of the
land" or "due process of law" as found in the constitutions of
several states and in the federal Constitution gave opportunity
to the courts to translate the historical-philosophical concepts
of liberty into a judicial concept. The validity of legislation
became a duty on the courts to determine. Judicial review
of legislation became an accepted fact. Legislation as it affected the individual or his vested rights was to be determined
by the courts. Corwin's analysis of the contest between those
who preferred legislative supremacy in the legislative field
and those who favored judicial review over legislation and historically won the contest makes interesting reading.
Corwin in the Fourth Chapter, bearing the title "Liberty
Under the Fourteenth Amendment," by means of selected cases
interprets the constitutional trends since the Civil War. For a
period after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Amendment was given a restrictive interpretation. During
this same period liberty was defined by constitutional writers
and also interpreted by the courts to mean definite restraints
and limitations upon the exercise of governmental powers.
The principles of laissez-faire in economics were translated
into the juridical concepts of liberty. "Life, liberty and prop-
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erty" were protected under the "due process" and the "equal
protection" clauses. By virtue of these clauses, legislative acts
dealing with substantive and procedural rights were subject
to be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. The burden was placed on the states to prove validity of their acts.
There were a series of cases in which the Supreme Court
adopted as a theory that the police power of a state is by analogy similar to the police power of the British Parliament, and
therefore, all legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional.
In other cases the Court made use of another principle of construction, namely, that a statute would be declared unconstitutional if the court did not have sufficient facts to justify it,
based upon the principles of judicial notice. The court made
use of either the doctrine of presumed validity or the complimentary doctrine of judicial notice depending upon the nature of the case and the results which they wished to secure.
During and after World War I, the juridical concept of
liberty was extended. Freedom of speech and of the press,
which are protected by the first anxendment from abridgment
by Congress are liberties which are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the states. During and immediately after the depression
years, the court extended the juridical concept of liberty by
sustaining the minimum wage acts and by recognizing the
rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively with
their employers. Picketing was given the label of freedom of
speech. Under the concept of liberty, religious groups were
permitted greater freedom in carrying out their objectives
by restricting the police power of the states. Corwin's view
is that in recent years, the concept of civil liberty as he defined
it, has replaced the concept of constitutional liberty. Constitutional principles as developed by the Supreme Court fully
justify the view as presented by the author that the Supreme
Court's role has been that of a doctrine maker. Its chief task
as to the future will be to translate the constitutional liberties
and civil liberties, which were developed when governmental
restraints were limited, to meet our present problems in a
society where the function of government has been modified
and enlarged. This book has merits for laymen and lawyers. It
is an excellent text book for students in Constitutional Law.
0. H. THORMODSGARD
Dean, University of North Dakota School of Law.
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POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, by Hans Morgenthau. Alfred A.
Knopf, New York, 1948. Pp. xvi, 1489, Index xx. $5.50.
According to Professor Morgenthau of the University of
Chicago, the people of the United States can no longer treat
the study of international politics in a disinterested manner.
In our past, domestic problems were our main concern. The
problems of the world could be settled not only without the
participation of the United States, but they could be settled
without influencing the domestic problems of this country.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has. become
the most powerful country in the world. In the face of the
two bloc system into which the world is now divided, what
the United States does is of vital concern not only to this
country domestically, but also to the rest of the world.
Because of our world position, the author has undertaken to
write a book with a dual purpose: first, to enable the reader "to
understand the forces which determine political relations
among nations"; and second, to enable the reader to understand the problems which confront the peacemakers. Professor Morgenthau believes that international politics is a struggle for power; and in the past few decades, has also become
a struggle for peace. He has therefore divided his book into
the struggle for power and the struggle for peace.
In the first division the author discusses imperialism and
national power. He then gives an account of the various
methods which were used in the past to impose limitations
on this struggle for power. These limitations include the balance of power, international morality, world public opinion and
international law.
After a discussion of world politics in the Mid-Twentieth
Century, Mr. Morgenthau begins his account of the struggle
for peace. By clever and seemingly logical conclusions, illustrated by numerous well chosen examples, the author systematically discards the practicability of disarmament, collective
security, international police forces, judicial settlement, peaceful change and international government (Holy Alliance,
League of Nations and the United Nations). The author
clearly, step by step, shows the practical difficulties encountered by those who attempted to use the above methods to
maintain the peace of the world. He attributes the failure of
these methods to the character of international politics itself-
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i.e., international politics as a struggle for power, a struggle
made more bitter by the nationalism of our day.
According to Mr. Morgenthau, peace can be achieved only
after the political aspects of our problems are settled. This
can be done, according to the author, by reviving diplomacy.
Diplomacy can be revived if the parliamentary procedures
now followed are abandoned. Once we are rid of the "vices"
of public negotiation and majority vote, then international conflicts can be mitigated to such an extent as will enable the
specialized agencies of the United Nations to develop a sense
of loyalty among the peoples of the world. This international
loyalty is then expected to replace the nationalistic feelings
which now prevent the peaceful settlement of our international
disputes. Upon this foundation of loyalty, we can hope to build
a world state.
Of particular interest to the legal profession is the author's
analysis of the role of international law and international
courts. He shows the mechanical shortcomings of all attempts
to preserve peace through the judicial process and later shows
the political factors which led to these shortcomings. In this
light he maintains that the analogy between the role played
by domestic law and courts in maintaining order and the role
which could be played by international law and courts is
very deceptive.
We need not agree with all or any of Professor Morgenthau's
conclusions, but we owe it to ourselves to read this stimulating,
thought-provoking book.
HENRY J. TOMASEK
Political Science Department
University of North Dakota

THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE, by Andrei Vyshinsky. Trans-

lated by Hugh W. Babb. Macmillan Co., New York, Publishers. Pp. 749. $15.00.
This is the standard work of Soviet Law. Its author certainly needs no introduction. As of the date the review was
begun, late in January 1949, it was reported that Andrei
Vyshinsky was suffering from a "serious nervous disorder"
and was "irrational." At that time, he was ostensibly con-
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valescing at a Czechoslovakian health resort.' To anyone familiar with the rise and fall of public figures in the Soviet
Union, it could easily have been surmised that Vyshinsky had
been purged or was due for purging, as a plea of bad health
is often used in such cases. But, in March, Vyshinsky was
elevated to the position of Foreign Minister of the U. S. S. R.,
thereby proving not only that he is on the way up, not down,
but also lending more significance and authenticity to the
book under consideration.
The Law of The Soviet State was written in 1936, a year of
great significance in the U. S. S. R. The Bukharinist purge
trials had just been completed. The last of the "old Bolshevik"
opposition to Stalin had just been liquidated, and as the chief
purge trial prosecutor Vyshinsky's star was on the rise. It
was the first step in a career which was to lead him to his
post as Chief Delegate to the United Nations, and ultimately
to the position he recently assumed.
The American edition of this book is part of the work of the
Russian Translation Project of The American Council of
Learned Societies, and has only recently been translated and
published in the English version. In the words of the introduction: 2
"Every Soviet student of government and law reads Vyshinsky's book. Administrators and jurists use it for reference.
It is, in a sense, the militant handbook of those engaged in
government. It provides a guide through the intricacies of
the central and local levels of administration, an explanation of
the Constitution, and a documented analysis of the laws relating to the courts, elections and rights and duties of citizens.
It is designed also as a means of instilling in the public
official a firm conviction that he is a part of a system of government which has no equal in the world outside."
Vyshinsky's intellect and breadth of learning shines through,
despite what the American reader will find to be a shocking
exposition of the theory of law and justice. It may seem almost
tragic that a man of Vyshinsky's mental caliber should see
the law, and the world, only through the distorted lens of
Marxian dialectic.
I It

has been suggested that Vyshinsky was actually:
(a) In Czechoslovakia to arrange for the purging of the Czech Communist
Boss, Klement Gottwald, for "Tito-ist" tendencies;
(b) Actually in Hungary masterminding the Cardinal Mindzenty trial.
Communist trials are carefully stage-managed productions, with scripts
as carefully prepared as in any theatrical performance.
2 By John W. Hazard, Professor of Public Law at Columbia University.

NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS

He is, for instance, capable of quoting at great length from
the constitutions of the world's major and minor powers; his
knowledge of the American form of government is detailed
and, with certain exceptions, remarkably factual. No authority
in the realm of government, law or legal philosophy has escaped his attention. He has the remarkable faculty of quoting
out of context in such a way as to condemn our form of government, even when the authority quoted is as staunch a defender
of American democracy as, for example, Woodrow Wilson.
Here is a sample from Vyshinsky's comments on the United
States:
"Furthermore, it must be added that committees enjoy a
broad right of inviting to their councils 'experts' - representatives of the world of finance and industry. Through the
committees the influence of trusts on Congress develops most
directly-unique 'parliaments' behind the scenes made up of
representatives, ministers, and 'experts' (financiers and so on)
working at a distance from publicity and in fact playing a
decisive part in the enactment of this law or that. Committees
are also canals through which the financial resources of the
treasury often flow into the pockets of the big monopolist
enterprises."
Here is Vyshinsky's view on the birth of the American
Constitution:
"The first act of the United States was the Declaration of
Independence, adopted by the Congress on July 4, 1776. This
differed from the declaration of the separate states in that it
speaks of unalienable rights of citizens only in a general way
and without precise definition or enumeration, saying: 'We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.' However, the Declaration of Independence, like other similar declarations, remained mere promises which the bourgeoisie, having assumed authority, neither
fulfilled nor even set about fulfilling. Popular agitations began. In Massachusetts a former captain of the Revolutionary
Army, Shays, raised a revolt, 'the delegates (of the Congress)
seeming to fear a triumphant American army almost as much
as they did the soldiers of George III.' Events compelled the
bourgeoisie, interested in creating a powerful administration,
to set about the creation of a federal constitution."
"The convention which assembled to work out the Constitution consisted of the biggest financiers and merchants,
and owners of land and slaves; of course, the Constitution
worked out by such people meticulously guaranteed the interests of capital. The Constitution does not include a single
one of the fundamental civil rights depicted in such detail in
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the constitutions of numerous states. It is not surprising that
there was a wave of indignations against ratifying the Constitution drafted by the convention, chiefly on the part of
small farmers, city laboring people, and the population
burdened with debts. Notwithstanding the powerful opposition of the masses, the Constitution was adopted by legislative
assemblies of the states with an over-whelming majority of
representatives from the 'have' classes. In all, 160,000 citizens
expressed themselves for affirmation of the Constitution, less
than 5 per cent of the population of the thirteen states. A
great wave of dissatisfaction compelled the state legislators
to adopt a series of amendments, chiefly proposals as to fundamental civil rights. Within two months after the storming
of the Bastille in Paris, and one month after the National Assembly in France had adopted the Declaration of Rights of
Man and Citizen, the Congress of the United States assembled
for final formulation of the Constitution. The influence of these
events on the decision of Congress is indubitable. The first
session adopted the Bill of Rights in the form of ten amendments to the Constitution. The first five confirmed freedom of
conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly; the right to bear arms; a prohibition against
billeting soldiers in private houses without consent of the
owner; the inviolability of the person, dwelling, and papers
of citizens; and responsibility of citizens to the court, and the
right to life, liberty, and property. The remaining five speak
of measures of criminal punishment, legal procedure, and so
on."
It is extremely difficult to realize that this book is osten-

sibly a law book, because every piece of information about
Soviet law is so intertwined and intermingled with propaganda
and Marxist doctrine, that the average reader would consider
it to be more on the order of a propaganda tract. There is one
thing for sure. No one who reads this book will ever again
suppose there can be any "middle ground" or compromise between the Soviet Union and the West. Vyshinsky emphasizes
repeatedly that Communism 3 can only triumph with finality
if the necessary revolution completely smashes, demolishes and
destroys the fabric of the Capitalist 4 state. Here is a sample:
"Guided by Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet state always started
from the position that the perishing classes would resist with
a It is illuminating to note that the word Communism is not, to the reviewer's
observation, used at any place in the book. "Democracy," "Socialism," "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and similar terms are to be the more official ways in
which the Soviet bureaucracy refers to itself.
4 Capitalist, is a word infrequently used by Vyshinsky; perhaps significantly
the essentially archaic and fraudulent word Bourgeoisie is preferred by him in
denouncing what we call Capitalist nations.
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all their powers until the last moment, and that their pitiless
(sic) repression would therefore always constitute an imprescriptible and necessary task of the proletarian dictatorship.
Accordingly, ... the pitiless repression of exploiters was
openly proclaimed as one of the basic tasks of Soviet authority.
In conformity with this principle of the proletarian dictatorship, Soviet authority takes substantial and definitive measures to crush the resistance of exploiter classes and their
elements. It expelled them from all organs of state authority
and cut off from them any access thereto. ... This is one of
the basic tasks of the proletarian dictatorship, wielding the
drawn sword of retribution created by the revolution - the
Cheka, the Ogpu, and the NKVD.5 The exploiter elements and
their assistants were deprived of political rights - particularly
the rights of suffrage."
To lawyers, there is much of interest in Vyshinsky's outline of the Russian court system.6 (It is significant that so
small a portion of this supposedly legal work is devoted to
this subject, in view of the huge sections devoted to pure propaganda and fanaticism.) The court of original jurisdiction in
the Soviet Union is the so-called People's Court. Vyshinsky
says:
"Through it passes the basic bulk of criminal and civil
matters."
It is composed of three members. The presiding judge is
called the President, who is presumably educated in the law;
the other two members are so-called people's assessors. These
assessors are apparently a cross between a juryman and a
layjudge. An observer, who claimed to have seen one of these
5 Now

called MVD. This change of name has no significance.

6 In this connection, a basic fact should be suggested, insofar as any trial

having political connontations occuring in any Soviet or Soviet-dominated
country is concerned: Such a court is an organ of vengeance to be used against
enemies of the State, and no Soviet jurist would deny this fact. Any concept
of "controversy" or "adversary" is ludicrous; there is no competition to see
which party is right, the prosecution or the defense. Even the defense attorneys
chime ir to excoriate their own clients. A quite conservative and factual sounding account by an eyewitness to the notorious Mindazenty trial in Hungary
makes this comment about the president of the court, one of the many Nazi
leaders in Europe during the war who found the switch to Communism convenient
and not especially abrupt:
"Olthi was the judge. Olthi also acted as prosecutor and jury. Like a machine
gun, Olthi rattled questions at the defendants. Olthi corhpletely drowned out
the man called the prosecutor, whose main function seemed to be making the
opening and closing remarks against the defendants . .. the defense tried to
call one (witness), but Olthi rejected the request. ... (he) hardly looked up
from the papers on his desk. Everything seemed to go according to schedule."
(Babriel Pressman, CBS from Vienna, 11 February, 1949).
Needless to say, defendants at such trials are well rehearsed and do not depart
far from the prescribed script; for grim reasons which are too obvious to
mention here.
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courts in operation in the city of Moscow about 1944, told
this reviewer that on the minor and trivial matters which he
saw presented to the court, a sort of crude justice was actually dealt out to the litigants. He said that concepts such as
precedent or case law, were entirely absent from the proceedings.7
In theory, an aggrieved party can appeal from the People's
Court to the Appellate Court. In connection with the Appellate Court, Vyshinsky says:
"The higher court in the U. S. S. R. cannot be limited, as
are courts of last resort in bourgeois states, to a mere formal
verification of the sentence or decision of the first court. Article 15 of the 1938 statute requires the higher court to verify
both the legality and the basis of the sentence and decision appealed from - the fundamental soundness thereof in substance
as well as in form."
These appellate courts exist in each region, territory or area.
Each of the autonomous (sic) republics of the Soviet Union
has its own appellate court which is called the Autonomous
Republic Supreme Court. Above the appellate courts is the
court of last resort. This court is called the Supreme Court
of the U. S. S. R. Apparently this latter body has the additional
function of generally supervising the administration of justice
through the Soviet Union.
As do Western nations, the U. S. S. R. has a separate system
of military justice. In addition, to the functions which our
military courts perform, there are assigned the following ominous (to Western eyes) additional areas of jurisdiction:
"The jurisdiction of military tribunals includes authority
over military and counterrevolutionarycrimes and over crimes
against administrative order or particular danger for the
U. S. S. R., if perpetrated by persons in military service or
obligated thereto or held up to the same responsibility, as well
as over crimes of treason, espionage, terror,arson, and other
diversionist acts, irrespective of the prepetrator."a
There are also special courts, ostensibly to deal with transportation matters, both rail and water. Those who are interested in the role of labor in the Soviet Union might well ponder
the following quotation in connection with these so-called
transportation courts:
Interesting observations on Soviet court procedure will be found, in somewhat abbreviated form in Burdick's "Bench and Bar of Other Lands" pp. 425
et seq. (1939).
8 Italics added.

NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS

"(They have jurisdiction over crimes directed at undermining labor discipline in transportationand other crimes subversive of normal work therein."
There is much more of interest in this book. For instance,
Vyshinsky has complete and utter contempt for all parliamentary bodies in the Western nations. To him all members of
Congress and the State Legislatures in the United States are
tools and stooges of bourgeois interests. Because the state of
North Dakota has pioneered in establishing initiative and
referendum, it is significant to note that Vyshinsky thinks the
Soviet Union is the only nation in the world which has an
effective law providing for initiative and referendum. He
states flatly that although certain American states have laws
providing for initiative and referendum, these statutes are
meaningless as they are practically never used, and when they
are only used to serve the interest of monopoly capitalism.
Vyshinsky boasts particularly about the elective system of
the Soviet Union. It is probably needless to discuss the facts
of the case here, because a far more factual account of how
elections really work in the U. S. S. R. can be found by reading Victor Kravchenko's book "I Chose Freedom." Some of
Vyshinsky's comments on American elections, however, are
of interest because of the exaggerations contained therein. For
instance, he says:
"The election of but one President of the U. S. A. cost the
country thirty million dollars."
He also says:
"The election of three senators in Pennsylvania and Illinois
cost two million five hundred thousand dollars - all spent
on bribing voters."
The reading of this book is apt to confuse almost anyone.
It is part of the tradition of Marxism to write in an obscure and
muddy fashion, and Vyshinsky, despite the vast breadth of his
learning, is in this, as in other things, a true disciple of Marx.
The book is still well worth reading, especially in view of
Vyshinsky's new position as Foreign Minister of the biggest
empire in recorded history. No one who reads his book will
doubt that he is a remorseless enemy of the principles of government which Americans have been taught to revere and respect. To him there are only two ways: The Soviet way and the
enemy way. Vyshinsky lacks the hypocrisy characteristic of
Communists and fellow travelers in the United States and
elsewhere. He does not hesitate to use the word "dictatorship"
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in describing the Soviet government - in fact he uses it repeatedly - the customary phrase is "dictatorship of the proletariat." He does not hesitate to promise bloody vengence and
extermination for the enemies of the Soviet regime.
The publication of this book in America will do nothing to
quiet the fears of those who are afraid of Soviet Russia. It is,
however, of extreme value in enabling us to understand the
apparent vagaries of Soviet foreign policy.
WILLIAM S.

MURRAY*

Bismarck, N. D.

* William S. Murray is a member of the Bismarck, North Dakota Bar, a
member of the State House of Representatives and former Secretary of the
North Dakota Bar Association. In World War II he served with the Counter
Intelligence Corps and Office of Strategic Services; and for a brief period in
1947 worked for the post-war Central Intelligence Group.

